"Without it [oil] World War Two could never have been won. For oil, once processed or refined in various ways, became the source or indispensable material for laying runways, making toluene (the chief component of TNT) for bombs, the manufacturing of synthetic rubber for tires, and the distilling into gasoline (particularly at 100-octane levels) for use in trucks, tanks, jeeps, and airplanes. And, that is not to mention the need for oil as a lubricant for guns and machinery.

On 28 May 1941, even then before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established by a letter what became known officially as the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW), on 2 December 1942. To head that agency Roosevelt appointed the very capable Harold L. Ickes, who had been Secretary of the Interior. Ickes, soon after his appointment, selected 72 leaders of America's oil industry for the Petroleum Industry Council for National Defense, which later became known as the Petroleum Industry War Council (PIWC).

Ickes' right-hand man from the oil business became Ralph K. Davies, vice-president of Standard Oil of California, whom Ickes designated Deputy Petroleum Coordinator.

One oilman should be singled out so far as the laying of the Big Inch is concerned. That man was Burt E. Hull of the Texas Company (Texaco). He was what one might call the 'dean of the pipeliners' in the U. S. Under his direction the Big Inch was completed in record time.

Now for a brief account of the Little Big Inch. Its construction began 23 April 1943 with the placing of the last pipe on the East Coast on 8 October 1943.

The Big Inch and Little Big Inch pipelines, it should be stressed, aided almost beyond estimation the winning of World War Two by the Allies. For one thing, protected as they were from enemy attack, it was possible to circumvent submarine attacks by the Germans, which had wreaked havoc on oil tankers from the Gulf of Mexico by way of the Caribbean to the East Coast. In fact, before the two pipelines began to operate German submarines had sunk so many tankers, there were many beaches on islands in the Caribbean, which were seriously polluted with oil. But, it must be added—the Big Inch and the Little Big Inch pipelines were both finished before the D-Day invasion at Normandy on 6 June 1944. That made possible the delivery of huge quantities of crude and its refined products for Operation Overlord, the code name for that landing in northern France.

Now, it cannot be stated too forcefully, American oil, which amounted in all to 6 billion barrels, out of a total of 7 billion barrels consumed by the Allies for the period of World War Two, brought victory! Without the prodigious delivery of oil from the U. S. this global war, quite frankly, could never have been won."

Source:
"How Important Was Oil in World War II?"; Keith Miller, History News Network (HNN); Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, The George Washington University; October 11, 2001. https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/339

"In February 1942, the first 12 American tankers were sunk off the Atlantic coast by German submarines. In March even greater numbers of tankers were destroyed by torpedoes. As the fuel supply on the East Coast dwindled, a revolution in the transportation and distribution of petroleum began. All existing pipelines, railroad tank cars, and barges were dedicated to transporting oil north and east. Private oil companies began unprecedented practices, such as the pooling, exchanging, or sharing of facilities and equipment. However, tank cars and barges could not replace the capacity of the tankers. Oil field and refinery production declined as a result of the diminished amount of oil that could be transported.

Representatives of America’s pipeline industry met in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in March 1942 to formulate the basic American wartime pipeline strategy. The resulting 'Tulsa Plan,' which became the backbone of the PAW [Petroleum Administration for War] pipeline program, focused on developing the nation’s petroleum transportation system and reconditioning existing pipelines. One of the plan’s components called for the construction of a 24-inch-diameter, 300,000-barrel-per-day oil pipeline from East Texas to Illinois, where part of the supply would be refined and the remainder sent via a 20-inch-diameter pipeline to New York and Philadelphia. The plan also called for a products pipeline to be constructed from East Texas to Illinois. Another project involved converting the pipelines of 12 different companies to an integrated system that would increase the capacity of oil flowing into Illinois and East Coast refineries.

The Big Inch and Little Big Inch pipelines (Inch Lines) were constructed during 1942 and 1943 for the United States government by War Emergency Pipelines, Inc. (WEP), for the purpose of transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products from the Gulf Coast region to refining and distribution areas near New York City and Philadelphia.

In the decades preceding World War II, oceangoing tankers carried 95 percent of the crude oil and petroleum products transported from Gulf Coast producers and refiners to the Northeast—some 1.5 million barrels per day. Pipelines, on the other hand, transported only about 50,000 barrels per day. Beginning in 1941, tankers were diverted from the Gulf-to-Atlantic route, going first to Great Britain and later to the South Pacific. Fairly extensive pipeline systems distributed the petroleum within the Northeast and Midwest. During the war, the oil industry and the government undertook 35 different major pipeline projects, making it the greatest pipeline construction period in the history of the industry. By April 1945, pipeline shipments would soar to 754,000 barrels per day.

Construction of the Big Inch and Little Big Inch pipelines (Inch Lines) signaled a revolution in fuel transportation. Before the construction of this 24-inch-diameter line, most oil pipelines were no more than eight inches in diameter. Stretching 1,340 miles from Texas to New Jersey, the Big Inch was the largest, heaviest, and longest pipeline built up to that time. During its operation from August 1943 until August 1945, it delivered 300,000 gallons of oil a day and provided a secure transportation system beyond enemy reach, thereby becoming a 'symbol of American spirit.' The wartime success of the Big Inch and Little Big Inch ushered in the expansion of pipeline usage that continues to the present day.

The 24-inch-diameter main pipeline was supplied by the Longview Feeder System, which consisted of four separate pipelines connecting privately owned carriers and refineries with the tank farm at the Longview Station. The four pipelines included an 8-inch-diameter pipeline, 1.2 miles long, and a 24-inch-diameter pipeline, 5.7 miles long, for gathering East Texas crude oil; a 16-inch-diameter pipeline, 9.7 miles long, for gathering West Texas crude oil; and a 12-inch-diameter pipeline, 7.2 miles long, for gathering Southwest Texas crude oil.

The plan that was developed called for a 24-inch-diameter pipeline to carry crude oil, beginning at Longview, Texas, and running northeast through Arkansas and Missouri to Norris City, Illinois, a distance of 530.36 miles, with a right-of-way width of 75 feet. This leg was to be constructed first to supply a tank-car loading facility at Norris City, from which point the oil would move by rail to the East Coast. A tank farm would be built at Norris City to provide storage, and a 5-mile-long branch pipeline between the facility and Enfield, Illinois, would connect with oil pipelines of the Illinois Pipe Line Company and the Texas Pipe Line Company. This 24-inch-diameter branch pipeline, known as the 'Enfield Connection,' would provide an additional delivery capacity of 50,000 barrels per day.

Once the first leg of the pipeline was operational, a second leg, known as the eastward extension, was to be constructed. The extension would continue the 24-inch-diameter pipeline 721.76 miles to Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, where the pipeline would split into two 20-inch-diameter pipe laterals to serve refineries in the New York and Philadelphia areas. The New York lateral was 86.25 miles long and terminated in Linden, New Jersey; the Philadelphia lateral was 22.75 miles long and terminated in Chester Junction, Pennsylvania."

Source:
"Historic American Engineering Record (HAER NO. TX-76): War Emergency Pipeline (Inch Lines), Inch Lines Historic District"
The Inch Lines Historic District is a linear, multi-state resource, consisting of 27 individual property parcels, interconnected by a continuous legal right-of-way, located in the states of Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

The East coastal states of the United States (i.e. Atlantic coast) can be broken down as follows:

1. North-Atlantic coastal states (5): Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut;
2. Mid-Atlantic coastal states (5): New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia;
3. South-Atlantic coastal states (4): North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

A continental shelf is the edge of a continent that lies under the ocean. Continents are the seven main divisions of land on Earth. A continental shelf extends from the coastline of a continent to a drop-off point called the shelf break. From the break, the shelf descends toward the deep ocean floor in what is called the continental slope.

Even though they are underwater, continental shelves are part of the continent. The actual boundary of a continent is not its coastline, but the edge of the continental shelf. The widths of the continental shelves vary.

The legal definition of a continental shelf is different than the geographic one. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, every nation has a continental shelf extending no more than 200 nautical miles from the nation's coastline.

Source:
"Continental shelf–Encyclopedic Entry"; National Geographic. https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/continental-shelf/; accessed July 22, 2021.

The term "U-boat" is the English version of the German word U-Boot, a shortening of Unterseeboot, which means "undersea boat". While the German term refers to any submarine, the English description (as with many other languages) refers specifically to military submarines operated by Germany during World War I and World War II.

The Type IX U-boat was designed by Germany in 1935 and 1936 as a large ocean-going submarine for sustained operations far from the home support facilities. The extended range came at the cost of longer dive times and decreased maneuverability.

WASHINGTON. Jan. 23—(U.P.)—A navy spokesman intimated strongly today that some of the enemy submarines operating in United States waters have been destroyed or captured.

He did not state specifically how many of the undersea raiders had been dealt with, explaining that such data must be kept secret.

U-boats, which became active off the United States east coast more than a week ago, already have sunk or damaged six merchant vessels.

Text of the spokesman's statement:

There are many rumors and unofficial reports about the capture or destruction of enemy submarines.

Some, of the recent visitors to our territorial waters will never enjoy the return trip portion of their voyage. Furthermore, the percentage of one-way traffic is increasing while that of two-way traffic is satisfactorily on the decline.

But there will be no information given out about the fate of the enemy submarine excursionists who don't get home, until that information is no longer of aid and comfort to the enemy. This is a phase of the game of war secrecy into which every American should enter enthusiastically.

It is a phase which is important not only from the purely military viewpoint of naval operations, but from the viewpoint of psychological counter-offensive as well.

Text of the spokesman's statement (continued):

"This is a phase of the game of war secrecy into which every American should enter enthusiastically.

It is a phase which is important not only from the purely military viewpoint of naval operations, but from the viewpoint of psychological counter-offensive as well.

The Nazis think themselves pretty clever in the field of psychological warfare. Secrecy surrounding the fate of their submarines is a counterblow the American people can give them which may serve to shake some of their super-confidence.

It is a game in which every American can and should participate. The navy will 'take care' of enemy submarines, and the people can help the navy and the country by keeping quiet about what they see or hear of the process or its results.

Radio. Press Praised.
The press and the radio have made a great, patriotic contribution by voluntarily disciplining themselves in the matter of reporting such incidents as may have come to their attention unofficially.

All the people can make the same contribution. Even if you have seen a submarine captured or destroyed, keep it to yourself. Let the enemy guess what happened.

Then, as soon as the whole story can be told without giving aid or comfort to the enemy, it will be told, frankly and officially.

Source:
"Some U-Boat Raiders Sunk On East Coast, Navy Official Hints"; The St. Louis Star and Times; St. Louis, Missouri; 23 Jan 1942, Fri; Page 1.

"On December 9, 1941, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the Kriegsmarine, lifted all restrictions on German naval attacks against American vessels by his surface and submarine fleets. Atlantic sparring between the two powers had been occurring for several months but would now escalate into full-blown conflagration. For the United States a painful lesson on the consequences of complacency and arrogant refusal to accept outside assistance was coming.

Despite their fearsome reputation, the U-boats commanded by Admiral Karl Dönitz were few in number. When war flared with Great Britain on September 3, 1939, he counted just 57 U-boats, 46 of which were operational. German industry had concentrated on armaments to prosecute a war on land and in the air, and the deliveries of new submarines to the Kriegsmarine amounted to a paltry two per month. Despite this scarcity, ongoing mechanical problems, and unreliable torpedoes, Dönitz’s crews sank over a million tons of British shipping from July through October 1940 in what the submariners called the Happy Time.

The U-boat chief estimated a fleet of 300 submersibles would be required to adequately cut England off from its outside sources of supplies, and with his minuscule fleet’s early successes he may not have been overly ambitious in proclaiming that he might knock Great Britain out of the war before the United States entered the conflict. His hopes rose along with production figures, which later increased to 20 U-boats per month by the time Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941. It was time to show the Americans what they could expect from their adversaries and perhaps even make them think twice about dispatching an expeditionary force to Europe.

If the U-boats could seriously disrupt Atlantic shipping and also sink American supply ships close to their own shores, the losses would be even more demoralizing. Dönitz commenced plans for his first hunting forays into U.S. coastal waters. He called the missions Operation Drumbeat.

Kapitanleutnant (Lieutenant Commander) Reinhard Hardegen [skipper of U-123] would play a prominent role in the coming offensive.

After briefing Hardegen and two more of his submarine commanders, Richard Zapp of U-66 and Ernst Kals of U-130, Dönitz swiftly but efficiently guided Operation Drumbeat as it began to take shape. These three officers and their commands would make up Group Hardegen. They would steam as soon as possible for the U.S. East Coast and rendezvous with two other U-boats designated Group Bleichrodt. These five submarines would unleash an unprecedented reign of terror on the pitifully unprepared American coastline during the first six months of 1942. It was a campaign that went largely unnoticed by a German populace preoccupied with the Russian front and an American public still in shock over the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and anxiously watching the Philippines. It was nonetheless a monumental clash, and for the men involved it was the center of the universe.

Led by Hardegen, Operation Drumbeat had taken full advantage of American unpreparedness and resistance to accepting British aid in order to launch a devastating campaign against Allied shipping. Drumbeat’s destructive impact far exceeded the human and material toll of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

There was no excuse for the dearth of destroyer protection along the Eastern Seaboard. During the first four months of 1942, the transatlantic convoy routes were so sedate that sailors lost their fear of U-boats and became casual about showing lights at night. Just one convoy, 0N67 in late February, suffered a U-boat attack, losing six ships. Meanwhile, 62 vessels had been lost to torpedoes in coastal waters in less than two months. In March, 74 went down in the Atlantic west of 50 degrees west longitude.

In northern convoy waters, including the Halifax, Argentia, Hvalfjord, and Londonderry sectors, just 6.33 percent of the sinkings occurred, but 41.7 percent of the destroyer fleet was stationed there. The submarine-infested Eastern Seaboard saw 49.3 percent of the tonnage lost but only had 4.9 percent of the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic destroyers. Through it all, King ignored the accurate Royal Navy intelligence warnings he was receiving.

On January 23, the U.S. Navy lied to the American public, claiming to have destroyed an unspecified number of U-boats off the East Coast. In fact, the four miserably aimed bombs dropped in the general direction of U-123 by a patrol plane were the closest thing to an attack of any kind on a Drumbeat U-boat."

Source:
"Operation Drumbeat: U-Boat Marauders on the American Coast"; Kelly Bell; Warfare History Network; September 2011. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2016/12/01/operation-drumbeat-u-boat-marauders-on-the-american-coast/; accessed July 22, 2021.

"Unlike most navies operating submarines, the primary target of German U-boats was merchant shipping in order to cripple the enemies’ ability to wage war. Admiral Karl Dönitz, the Commander of German Submarine Forces, immediately drew up plans for operation Paukenschlag ('Drumbeat', also referred to as the 'Second Happy Time'), a devastating attack on shipping along the North American eastern seaboard, arguably the most congested sea-lanes in the world, using 12 of the longer-range Type IX boats. Dönitz believed that the industrial cities of the eastern seaboard were vulnerable to the disruption of these sea-lanes. Oil was critical for the American war effort. Most of the oil was provided by ships carrying it from the Netherlands West Indies, Venezuela, and the Gulf of Mexico ports of Houston and Port Arthur Texas.

The German offensive began 11 January 1942 when U-123 sank the SS Cyclops south of Nova Scotia. The first wave ended operation on February 6 and headed back to Germany. They sank 25 ships for a total of 156,939 tons. They were replaced by succeeding waves of U-boats without interruption. During the first six months of the U-boat offensive in North American coastal waters 397 ships totaling over 2 million tons were sunk with the loss of roughly 5000 lives. In the process only 7 U-boats were sunk.

Once in the hunting grounds, German submarines would rest on the continental shelf from early morning until late afternoon. During the day the U-boat would rise to the surface for air and sunlight, usually during late morning for a limited time, submerging again if sighting any object. Late in the afternoon they began the night’s activity against the shipping lanes. Unbelievably the merchant ships ran with their running lights on and were silhouetted against the fully-lit coastal cities and resort towns. All navigation aids were still lit and the ships followed the established sea-lanes. The surfaced submarine would lay in wait for an appropriate target to pass by. Surface attacks were preferred by the U-boat commanders. The Type IX boat had a surface speed of 18 knots. The submerged range was limited to 70 miles at 4 Knots. Periscope depth attacks were made if operations dictated.

A favorite hunting ground for German submarines was in the waters off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The narrowness of the continental shelf enabled the U-boats to operate in deep water close inshore with great effectiveness."

Source:
"1941 – Coast Guard Aviation Anti- Submarine Operations: The East Coast of the United States"; United States Coast Guard Aviation history; Coast Guard Aviation Association; https://cgaviationhistory.org/1941-coast-guard-aviation-anti-submarine-operations/; accessed July 21, 2021.

"Fully lighted navigation aids and coastal cities provided lighting to silhouette merchant targets. Merchant ships sailed alone and few if any patrol ships or aircraft were assigned. The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. Ring, who a year earlier told his Fleet that the United States needed to prepare for a war that was close at hand, had not implemented any effective antisubmarine warfare program. As a consequence, a small number of U-boats exacted staggering losses.

The U-boat effort against oil shipments was so effective, that in June 1942, the United States Army and Navy both supported an effort by the Petroleum Administration for War to construct a massive pipeline from Texas to the east coast. Due to the considerable allocations of steel and manpower required, this project was rejected on two previous occasions. This time, it was quickly approved by the Roosevelt administration.

Claiming to recognize the decisive points and critical vulnerabilities in the Caribbean theater associated with inadequate and inexperienced antisubmarine forces, and the allies' oil supplies, Dönitz dealt the allies an early devastating blow. However, due to the ignorance of Hitler and the German High Command regarding the use of sea power, Dönitz was not able to convince them to commit overwhelming force to the U-boat war in the Caribbean. Thus, despite tactically successful operations, the allies were able to keep enough oil and supplies flowing to defend England and maintain a robust shipbuilding program. In his memoirs, Dönitz noted that:

"The relationship between ships sunk and ships built shows clearly what grave consequences ensued for the German war effort from the failure of our leadership to do everything possible to initiate a speedy and large U- boat building program even as late as the outbreak of war and from our failure to use even such meager U-boat resources as we possessed exclusively to carry out their primary function, the destruction of enemy shipping."

In addition to the above failure, Dönitz cannot shield himself from shifting the focus of his attack from the Caribbean oil supplies to the wolf-pack attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic. In discussions with his staff, he commented: 'It is incomparably more important to sink than to reduce sinkings by making them in a prescribed area.' The sinking of ten ships carrying fruit to England is arguably of lesser importance than the sinking of a single tanker carrying oil to an east coast refinery, even if the former results in a higher tonnage for the war record.

Germany failed to seize an opportunity to inflict a devastating blow on the allied war effort by interdicting the supply of oil and gasoline to both England and the United States. England, dependent on oil and gasoline to fuel the Royal Air Force would have become even more vulnerable to the Luftwaffe attacks on industry and ports. The United States, although secure in its borders, would have suffered a reduction in shipbuilding and other war economy production."

Source:
"The U-Boat War In The Caribbean: Opportunities Lost"; Karl M. Hasslinger, Commander, United States Navy"; Naval History and Heritage Command; March 1996. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/u-boat-in-the-caribbean.html; accessed July 22, 2021.

"The greatest concentration of U-boat attacks happened off North Carolina’s Outer Banks, where dozens of ships passed daily. So many ships were attacked that, in time, the waters near Cape Hatteras earned a nickname: 'Torpedo Junction.' U.S. military and government authorities did not want people to worry, so news reports of enemy U-boats near the coast were classified or held back from the public for national security reasons. For many years, most people had no idea how bad things really were. But families living on the Outer Banks knew—they were practically in the war."

Source:
"When World War II Was Fought off North Carolina’s Beaches"; Kevin P. Duffus; Tar Heel Junior Historian Association, NC Museum of History; Spring 2008. https://www.ncpedia.org/history/20th-Century/wwii-uboats; accessed July 22, 2021.

"The statistics:
During the first 6 months of the German U-boat offensive out of the US east coast some 397 ships totaling over 2 million tons were sunk, costing roughly 5000 lives. In the process only 7 U-boats (U-85, U-352, U-157, U-158, U-701, U-153 and U-576) were lost. There were only survivors from U-352 (33) and U-701 (7), the rest went down with all hands. 302 Germans were lost on these 7 boats."

Source:
"Operation Drumbeat" Guðmundur Helgason; https://uboat.net/ops/drumbeat.htm; accessed July 22, 2021.

Database: "Chronological List of Ships Sunk or Damaged during January to June 1942"; American Merchant Marine at War; http://www.usmm.org/sunk42a.html; accessed July 26, 2021.

Database: "Ships hit by U-boats in WWII" (Search for merchant and warships hit by U-boats during WWII); https://uboat.net/allies/merchants/; accessed July 26, 2021.

Germany considered its attacks against the United States a success, even if they failed to win the war. Gerhard Weinberg, a professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has since called the war zone off the U.S. coast in 1942 "the greatest single defeat ever suffered by American naval power."

"British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who rode in a cavalry charge in the Sudan in 1898, escaped from the Boers in 1899 and served for six months as a troop leader in the Western Front trenches in 1915-1916, remarked during World War II, 'The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.'

The former First Lord of the Admiralty had good reason to be alarmed. Shipping losses from German U-boats had brought his country to within three weeks of starvation in 1917, and two and a half decades later history was repeating itself with a vengeance. When German Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz intensified his offensive against Allied shipping in the North Atlantic late in the spring of 1942, losses rose alarmingly.

When Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their military staffs met at Casablanca in January 1943, it had been decided to make the defeat of the U-boats a priority objective. 'U-boat warfare takes the first place in our thoughts,' stressed Churchill.

In middle of May the US finally started running convoys on the east coast, over 4 months too late. They proved to be effective right from the start like the British had known for more than 2 years at that time and had told the US Navy command again and again.

On 19 July Dönitz withdrew the last two boats operating of Cape Hatteras, U-754 and U-458, and 8 days later he shifted the effort back into the North Atlantic where it had all begun and would eventually end.

Royal Navy Admiral Sir Max Horton, a veteran of submarine action during World War I, led the fight against Nazi U-boats during the critical World War II Battle of the Atlantic.

After June 1943, the U-boats never again posed a threat to Britain’s lifeline, upon which depended the massive Allied invasion of Normandy a year later. New destroyers and other purpose-built escort vessels entered service in increasing numbers, and merchant shipping construction was finally outstripping losses. Although U-boats were still being built at a rate that kept pace with sinkings, the new crews lacked the training and experience of their predecessors."

Source:
"Max Horton: Leading the Charge Against the U-Boats"; Michael D. Hull; Warfare History Channel https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/12/15/max-horton-leading-the-charge-against-the-u-boats/; accessed July 23, 2021.

"Although the Skl [Seekriegsleitung; Maritime Warfare Command] considered location devices the bane of its U-boats, there were actually a number of reasons for the Allied victory in the Atlantic in the spring of 1943. The Allies had recognized the serious threat posed by U-boats and devoted considerable human and material resources to develop effective countermeasures. Unknown to Dönitz, in May 1941 the British had captured a German submarine with its Enigma code machine, complete with instructions. After studying the Enigma machine the Allies were able to decipher messages to and from the U-boats. Knowing the location of submarines allowed the British to reroute convoys and dispatch antisubmarine forces to attack them.

The Germans stubbornly believed their codes were unbreakable and made few changes in signals communication. But even the ability to decipher the German Navy’s messages, though it was a key development, alone did not account for the Anglo-American success.

Another vital factor was the Allies’ ability to provide air cover over the entire North Atlantic with escort carriers and very-long-range aircraft operating from land. The formation of support groups to hunt U-boats and assist convoys under attack also increased German submarine losses. In addition, the introduction of ten-centimeter-wavelength radar, high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF, or “Huff-Duff”), and new antisubmarine weapons all played key roles. The German obsession with devising countermeasures to radar caused them to ignore the threat from decryption and direction-finding equipment.

Although Dönitz blamed Allied aircraft for the turn of the tide in the U-boat war, at least when he was with Hitler, in fact the navy was not blameless, having allowed the enemy to gain the technological lead and failed to make submarine construction a priority."

Source:
"The U-boat War, the Baltic Sea, and Norway I"; Weapons and Warfare: History and Hardware of Warfare; February 2021. https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2021/02/05/the-u-boat-war-the-baltic-sea-and-norway-i; accessed July 23, 2021.

*Source:
"They kept everything"; Mileage/gas rationing during WWII; Frank Kownacki; Posted January 2014.https://familyephemera.tumblr.com/post/73744494852#_=_; accessed July 25, 2021.

"World War II put a heavy burden on US supplies of basic materials like food, shoes, metal, paper, and rubber. The Army and Navy were growing, as was the nation’s effort to aid its allies overseas. Civilians still needed these materials for consumer goods as well. To meet this surging demand, the federal government took steps to conserve crucial supplies, including establishing a rationing system that impacted virtually every family in the United States.

Tires were the first product to be rationed, starting in January 1942, just weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Everyday consumers could no longer buy new tires; they could only have their existing tires patched or have the treads replaced. Doctors, nurses, and fire and police personnel could purchase new tires, as could the owners of buses, certain delivery trucks, and some farm tractors, but they had to apply at their local rationing board for approval. Good, functional tires became so valuable that the boards often advised auto owners to keep track of the serial numbers on their tires in case they were stolen.

Personal automobiles met a similar fate in February 1942 as auto manufacturers converted their factories to produce jeeps and ambulances and tanks. Gasoline was rationed starting in May of that year, and by the summer even bicycle purchases were restricted.

As World War II came to a close in 1945, so did the government’s rationing program. By the end of that year, sugar was the only commodity still being rationed. That restriction finally ended in June 1947. Plenty of other goods remained in short supply for months after the war, thanks to years of pent-up demand. Before long, however, manufacturers had caught up, and Americans could buy all the butter, cars, and nylon hosiery they wanted."

Source:
The National WWII Museum (Official WWII museum of the United States), New Orleans, Louisiana; https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/rationing; accessed July 25, 2021.

In October 1943, the Office of War Information issued the following report on the gasoline supply and the reasons for rationing as well as an explanation of the gasoline rationing program.

"Gasoline available to civilians is running some 500,000 barrels short of the daily pre-war supply as military needs take ever-increasing amounts and production is urgently pressed, the Office of War Information reported today on the basis of information provided by government agencies. Sources consulted in the preparation of this report were; Office of Price Administration, Petroleum Administration for War, Office of Defense Transportation, Office of Civilian Requirements (War Production Board), War Food Administration.

Although adjustments in rations like the recent ones may be expected from time to time, these will be within the framework of the basic shortage which will intensify for the duration. Degree of this fluctuation will depend upon the rate of military withdrawals from gasoline stocks and success of the new civilian allocations, and of measures taken to tighten the rationing system.

Not only will there probably be less automobile gasoline but its quality will become progressively poorer as greater amounts of the limited supply of tera-ethyl of lead are absorbed for aviation gasoline and 80-octane all-purpose gasoline.

Daily production of all types of gasoline, both for gasoline and military use, is about 1,800,000 barrels, of 42 gallons each. Of this, the armed forces and Lend-Lease take approximately 600,000 barrels daily, leaving for civilian use about 1,200,000 barrels a day. In 1941, civilians--including farmers and industrial users--consumed approximately 1,700,000 barrels a day, according to state gasoline tax figures.

The present civilian total allows approximately 550,000 barrels a day for passenger automobiles, 450,000 barrels for trucks, buses, and cabs, and 200,000 barrels daily for off-highway industrial and farm use.

Although it could not be revealed at the time, sinking of 14 large tankers bound for North Africa was responsible for last winter's Eastern fuel oil and gasoline crisis. The supplies lost were vital to the campaign in the Mediterranean which had reached a critical stage. Replacements had to be found and shipped at once.

The central fact in the problem of wartime gasoline is simple. Because of military needs, the drain on our gasoline supplies is increasing. Dwindling stocks must be parceled among a number of claimants. The government has met military demands fully -- demands unprecedented even in modern warfare. It has maintained essential civilian transportation, although at times with difficulty and some inequalities.

Sudden military takings will occur again, but facts concerning them cannot always be immediately disclosed to the public. Supply cannot always be estimated accurately. Swift adjustments may have to be made. Civilian motorists consequently need not expect to drive 'as usual' while war lasts.

Less automobile gasoline is being processed from each barrel of crude oil as increasing amounts of oil go into high-octane aviation fuel, toluene for explosives, butadiene for synthetic rubber, and into scores of other petroleum war products. Only about 25 per cent of each 42-gallon barrel of crude oil now goes into gasoline for civilian use. In 1940 and 1941, approximately 37 per cent of every barrel was processed into automotive gasoline.

Gasoline for civilians has been rationed in the East since May 15, 1942, when a temporary card plan of rationing was instituted to meet the first supply crisis. Coupon rationing in the East followed on July 22, 1942. Nationwide rationing to save rubber began on December 1, 1942. Additional curtailment in the East Coast states and the District of Columbia became necessary when gasoline supplies could not be maintained without more transportation than was available from the Southwest and the Midwest.

Before the war, 95 per cent of the East's petroleum supply came by tanker. On an average, one of the some 275 tankers would leave the Gulf of an Eastern port at intervals of about 100 minutes. Capacity of the tankers varied between 60,000 and 154,000 barrels per trip. The entire oil economy of the coastal region was based, not on periodic piling up of immense reserves, but on a steady, arterial flow of petroleum by tanker from the oil fields of the Southwest.

As soon as war broke out, the Axis concentrated submarine attacks on our coastwise tankers and sank many. The remainder of the fleet had to be withdrawn to supply oil for the European and Pacific theaters of war.

The only recourse was to improvise until the entire West-East overland transport system could be remodled to make up for the loss of the tanker fleet.

The rapid mobilization of inland oil transport facilities, chiefly some 112,000 tank cars and fleets of tank trucks and barges, and the construction of new pipelines and barges, was one of our major home front victories.

In January, 1942, the capacity for moving petroleum and its products overland from the Southwest to the East Coast was slightly more than 200,000 barrels a day. Nearly a million and a half -- or seven times as much -- can be moved daily now. It is estimated that by March, 1944, we will be able to transport between 1,600,000 and 1,700,000 barrels of petroleum products a day, providing supplies are available. Of the latter amount, 535,000 barrels a day will be provided by the 24" Big Inch pipeline and the 20" line, when both are operating at capacity. An ultimate capacity of 735,000 barrels a day of petroleum is foreseen by PAW when all its pipelines projects are completed.

'Excess consumption' is a term often misunderstood. PAW provides a certain amount of gasoline per day, for b quota needs and to maintain or build up reserve stocks. There is no means for segregating reserve from current supplies. Excess consumption simply overdraws from the total amount in bulk storage. At no time has over-consumption exhausted supplies in primary storage, but it has reduced them to such a point that distribution became extremely difficult.

The oil industry estimates it must have a working capital of at least 7,000,000 barrels of gasoline for the Eastern area before there is freedom from distribution difficulties. A certain amount must be maintained in transit. Some stock must be maintained in storage. When stocks fall low, distribution troubles increase tremendously. An example of this principle is the 'Big Inch' pipe which must have a line fill of 1,700,000 barrels before it can begin deliveries at its eastern terminal. That amount is, to all intents and purposes, a permanent loss to the consumer; it is as much a part of the machinery of transport as the pipe and pumps.

While production is still rising in the Southwest, PAW states that the only remaining oil fields capable of increasing supplies in any sizable amount are in West Texas, except for a limited number of fields in East Texas and on the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana. These, according to PAW, can produce little more than 200,000 additional barrels a day--a temporary stop-gap, at best."

Source:
Full Report: "Office of War Information Report on Civilian Gasoline Supply (October 13, 1943)" http://royblakeley.name/prewaldronarkansas/gasolinesuppliesreport.html